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Research Developments 
Experimental Methods in Economics and Political Science: 
The Design and Testing of Policy Options 
Designer rnarkets are becon1ing a reality: 
theoretical developments in economics and 
political science are nO\V being combined 
\vith advances in laboratory technology to 
produce ne\v uses of basic science and a ne\V 
. approach to policy. In essence the approach 
is sirnilar to that of engineering, in \Vhich 
scientific principles 
and practical kno\vl-
edge from laboratory 
experirnents arc used 
to design systen1s or 
devices to perform a 
specific function. The 
ne\v research cfforlS 
can be understood as 
involving a design 
·rnethodology in the 
truest sense of the 
\\'ord. Policy issues are 
first cast as problems 
of decision process 
design and the 
architectures of 
decision mechanisn1s 
are then built on basic 
research foundations. 
Refinements and 
adjustn1cnts to institutions, organizations 
and procedures-\vhich provide strength 
and desirability to a policy process-are then 
added as a result of lhe practical experience 
provided by laboratory experin1entation and 
testing. The practical experience and testing 
arc achieved by involving real people in 
controlled exercises that carefully replicate 
the constraints, the freedom for individual 
initialive, and lhe potential re\vards of the 
process under lest. 
The basic n1ethodology is so sin1ple it \Vould 
seern Ull\\'Orthy of staten1ent. Firsl, n1any 
policies involve the establish1nent of a 
process through \\'hich relevant econon1ic 
decisions are to be n1ade. An exarnple n1ight 
he a proposed national policy on reducing 
air polhuion that changes the process 
through \\1hich e1nission decisions are 1nadf' 
fro1n one in\'olving centrali1.ed adrninistra-
ti\'f' revie\\' to one basf'd upon the decentral-
ized purchase or sale of perniits. 
Such processes, called "1nerhanisn1s" in the 
tech11irt1l literature. arc the focus of the 
rt'scarrh. ·ro arhie\'t' the desired results fron1 
!he operation of a process, the individuals 
\vorking \Vithin it should not be required to 
make decisions that are al odds with their 
own self-interest. The mechanism must be 
incentive compatible and the multitude of 
individual decisions must be properly 
coordinated. It sounds like common sense, 
but in the context of the operations of a 
mechanism, \Vith a 
possibly large number 
of strategically inter-
acting individuals, the 
relationships can 
become very subtle 
and complex. Institu-
tional features that 
might appear inno-
cent or irrelevant can 
have profound 
influences on the 
ultimate decisions. 
Tools are needed to 
gauge process perfor-
mance. Models of 
behavior are needed 
to provide an under-
standing of the 
choices that might 
evolve from the 
mechanism once it is in place. A methodol-
ogy for testing is needed to determine if the 
mechanism really works as theory suggests. 
The approach has roots in several disci-
plines. The focus of policy research on the 
study of decision-making processes-as 
opposed to a tradilional focus on particular 
decisions and the personalities of important 
decision 1nakers-comes from the field of 
Public Choice. The substance of Public 
Choice theory is thal public decisions are as 
n1uch a product of the mechanism through 
which decisions are made and expressed as 
lhcy are a product of the personalilies of the 
individuals in the decision-making organiza-
tions. Public Choice, together with the n1ore 
technical field of Social Choice theory, 
provide additional tools that facilitate the 
evaluation of the products of policy processes. 
Social Choice theory provides both a con-
cept of efficient social choices and also the 
tools for 111easuring- the outputs of the 
n1echanisn1 in order lo deterrninc the 
degree to \\•hi ch normative goals of a process 
are allained. c;iven lirnited options, a pattern 
of conflicting- preferences over options. and 
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a pallern of infor1nation, does the process 
produce the proper result? The 1ncasure-
n1ent, carried out by observing the decisions 
of real people, is objecti\'e and not necessar-
ily related to \\'he th er or not people .are 
happy '''ith the process or feel 
good about the outcome. 
The disciplines of economics 
and political science pro\1dc 
sets of principles that are 
based on the purposeful 
heha,ior of indi,1duals. 
Theories fron1 these disci-
plines.provide connections 
among the choices of indi\1du-
als and the overall perfor-
mance of the decision process, 
\\•hich can depend upon 
hundreds of such indi\odual 
decisions. The theories 
characterize the relationships 
among individual motivations 
and choices and the resulting 
system beha\for. A special set 
of tools, prmoded by game 
theory, connects institutions 
and the information available 
to an individual at the moment 
of decision and integrates 
these with strategic beha\Oor. 
A major new tool that gives the 
overall approach a sense of newness is 
prmided by rapidly-developing laboratory 
experimental techniques. Through these 
techniques, real people are used to make 
real decisions to explore and establish 
patterns of individual and group beha\ior. 
Substantial financial incentives (that are 
actually paid) are used as a source of n1otiva-
tion of subjects. The value that people place 
on the outcomes of policy is replaced in the 
laboratory by a possible financial payment 
that an individual, depending upon the 
outcorne of the process, can accrue. \Vi th 
the control pro\1ded by incentives, conflicts 
across the objectives of different indh1duals 
can be induced; and, simple mechanisn1s for 
resoh1ng the conflicts can be irnplernented 
in a laboratory en\1ronment and in a 
1nanner that is theoretically understandable. 
The lessons of an experiment are derived 
from the fact that general theories should 
\\'Ork in simple, special cases. If they do not, 
then they can be rejected as being general. 
Sitnple, special case, laboratory processes 
are thus an appropriate testing ground for 
general theories about behavior. For ex-
an1ple, experi1nentalists in the field of 
econon1ics can create sin1plf' rnarkets in 
\\'hich, theoretical!~· speaking, tht' l;I\\' of 
supply and den1and (and \'arious incarna-
tions of the la\\') can ht' obser\'ed in opera-
tion. In fact, such tnodcls do indeed operate 
and \\'ith a great deal of accuracy. Srnall 
group experi1nents, to '\'hich 
n1odels fron1 gan1e theory can 
be applied, pro\'idc an 
opportunity to test theories of 
strategic behavior such as the 
Core, Bargaining Set. and 
theories of voting behavior. 
Many replications of experi-
ments in\'olving different 
subject pools, experin1entcrs, 
societies, countries and 
differing experirnental 
procedures have pro,·idcd 
evidence that the behaviors 
observed in laboratory 
experiments are a conse-
quence of the decision 
mechanism and not the 
special characteristics of 
subjects involved or labora-
tory procedures used. Theo-
ries of economics and political 
science have been substan-
tially influenced by the data 
from such laboratory experi-
mentation: one result is that 
many of the basic principles found in the 
literature are backed by solid experimental 
data. The study of simple cases has revealed 
the nature of errors and inaccuracies of 
theories; and in response to the data, the 
theories have been modified and improved. 
The step from basic laboratory science to the 
application of laboratory methods to policy 
is a big one. The process is facilitated by 
applying "experimental testbedding" in 
\\'hich a policy is irnplernented in a labora-
tory en\1ron1nent. The lessons learned frorn 
a "testbed experiment" folio\\' the same logic 
as do basic scientific endeavors. If a postu-
lated policy process does not '"ork in a very 
si1nple laboratory testbed environn1ent then 
it is not reasonable to expect it to \\'ork if 
implemented in a complex field setting. 
Thus, the laboratorv exercise can be en1-
ployed as a "proof ;f principle." Moreover, if 
a policy operates acceptably in a testbed 
environment it rnust do so for theoretically 
understandable reasons. Forn1ally speaking, 
the policy must pass a test of "design consis-
tency" in \\1hich it is cle111onstrated that the 
behavior of the process is consistent \\'ilh the 
beha\1oral prin<"iples upon \\'hich it is huilt. 
If the behavior of' the po lie\' is acreptahle, 
hut not understandable. thl'n tht'JT is no 
ground for believing that the policy \Votild 
operate the satne \Vay in theoretically sirnilar, 
but different environn1ents. 
The testbed need not be limited to the 
investigation of single processes. The 
1nethodology provides a tool for testing 
con1pcting policies by obser\~ng their 
operation in identical environments. Ne\v 
policies can e\·olve from combinations of 
those that \\'ere tested. At a minimum the data 
fron1 laboratorv contexts places a burden on 
advocates of a fosing policy to explain \Vhy the 
evidence should be ignored or \Vhat type of 
testbed 1night yield different results. 
r\.<> a practical 1nauer experimental testbeds 
also provide a tool for discovering policy 
"bug-s." In1plementation of a policy nieans 
that every feature n1ust be n1ade opera-
tional: exacth• \\'ho does \\'hat and v..1hen 
must be specified. \i\1ho signs \Vhat and \Vho 
is informed about 'vhat and \Vhen are all 
. irnportant details that can have pronounced 
influences on behavior. This forcing of 
detail, con1mitn1ent to detail, and interac-
tion of deL'lil \Vith ensuing beha\~or can 
uncover problems that could cost millions of 
dollars to rectify \Vere the policy irnple-
rnented in today's litigious society, without 
prior testing. 
An example of the application of testbed 
rnethodology is an issue that is no\v under 
consideration bv the Federal Communica-
tions Comn1issiOn (FCC): a ne\v federal 
policy to pri\'atize rights to use the air\\'aves 
for personal con1n1unication de\~ces such as 
cellular telephones. In essence, the Commis~ 
sion has decided to auction off the electro-
n1agnetic spectrum and allo\\' 1narket 
processes to replace rnany of the administra-
tive re\1e\\' processes that have been utilized 
in the past. The FC:c; \Votild like to conduct 
thl' sale as soon as possible but a controversy 
has challenged the rules of the auction. A 
total of about 2;JOO possible licenses exist. 
'fhl' plan proposed by the FCC is to sell t\vo 
licl'llS('S in each or;} I extensive regions in 
the L'nited States called "1najor trading 
areas" (i\fT1\s) and 10 sell five additional 
lit't'll'>l'S in each of -19'.! s1naller areas called 
"hasir trading areas" (131~-\.-;), 
·rht· <]Ul'stion posed for testbed research is 
Ju)\\' I he F(~(~ can 1nost responsibly auction 
the -;pcctru111 in a \\'<lY that allocates a scarce 
;11HI potentialh prolitahll' resource in a \vay 
1hat "·ill crealt' the 1nosl \'alue to the nation. 
-rhe nu1nher ol wa\·s 1ha1 the lic<'n<;cs 111igh1 
bt' .dlocat<'d ;unong co1npc1i11g lirins 1111111-
ln·r li1cralh· in tile 111nltiples of billion . ;;, and 
hoili 1e1·1l11ir;il .111d 1'< 0110111ic j\\lH'S art· 
involved. An auction process dealing \\'ith 
the resulting cornplications has never existed 
anywhere, except perhaps on the pages of a 
scholarly journal. 
Many alternative auction mcchanisn1s \Vere 
suggested by firms responding to a notice of 
proposed rule~making that \Vas issued in 
Novembc'r of 1993. The choice of mechanism 
is controversial because the outcOme of thl' 
auction-\vho \\'ins and \\'ho loses-\vill be 
influenced by it<; architecture. The future of 
the cellular phone industry as \Veil as rnany 
associated industries hang in the balance. 
One group of potential license buyers has 
argued that it should be possible to bid on a 
single package consisting of a license in each 
of the 51 MTAs, thereby creating the basis 
for a nation\vide personal comrnunication 
system under a single operator. A sealed bid 
process has been proposed. Other operators 
argue against such packaging and against 
sealed bids, claiming that all licenses should 
be auctioned simultaneously according to 
the rules of continuously operating, ascend-
ing price auctions. They argue that a simulta-
neous, continuous auction process \vould 
allow bidders to group licenses to fit unique 
geographic needs. As the bids increase in 
some areas they can immediately react by 
changing the nature of the areas in which 
they want to operate. These firms argue that 
the creation of any sort of pre-organized 
packages on the part of the government 
would preferentially advantage the firms that 
propose them. · 
Still other firms argue that the licenses 
should be auctioned one at a tirne, in a 
sequence starting ''rith an auction of the 
most valuable licenses. They argue that 
bidders should be able to make sure that 
thev o\vn a license that is central to their O\\'Il 
op~rations before becoming con1n1itted to 
the purchase of licenses in outlying areas. 
Still other possibilities exist. 
\todern con1puterized, interactive n1echa-
nisn1s 1nake possible auction processes in 
\vhich bidders can n1ake "contingent bids" of 
the sort "I 'viii pay SX for license A if rny bid 
of SY for license B \Vins." It is also possible t1' 
design 1nechanisms in \Vhich bidders are 
allo\ved 10 subtnit bids on packages of their 
O\\'ll design. and in \vhich the cornputer sorts 
out packages that fit together and deter-
1nines the high bidders at each stag-e of a 
continuous bidding process. :\hnost all of 
the proposals -;uh1nitted in responsr to the 
1~19'.\ notice of proposed rule-n1aking \\'t:r<' 
hased in part 011 the 1nodern theory of 
g;11nt·<>. hut the co111plexities an· <>11rh 1IL11 
\'t lj 
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differences of opinion regarding applica-
tions can easily exist---even among those 
who agree completely on the basic prin-
ciples of the theory. 
In .January of I 994, representatives of the 
National Telecommunications Administra-
tion and the FCC met at the California 
Institute of Technology (Caltech) to study 
the operations of various auction piocesses 
operating in laboratory testbed environ-
ments. Caltech researchers, associated with -
the Caltech Laboratory for Experimental 
Economics and Political Science, had 
conducted experiments with many of the 
different auction systems and presented 
results to the government and industry 
officials as to how the various auction systems 
\\'ork. In some cases the representatives were 
able to participate as subjects so they could 
experience for themselves hoY.' such poten-
tially complex auctions might be conducted. 
The results of the experimental work were 
submitted to the FCC and studied exten-
sively by governmental economists who then 
faced the task of using the data and existing 
theory to design a final auction mechanism. 
The Caltech data had demonstrated that 
proposals involving sequential auctions 
combined with a single national package of 
MTAs resulted in inefficient outcomes and a 
pattern of discrimination against certain 
types of participants. The experiments also 
demonstrated that concerns regarding 
complexity and the ability of humans to 
operate in an electronic marketplace of such 
magnitude were completely unfounded. 
From the testbed research a new proposal 
has emerged from the FCC: a simultaneous, 
electronic auction that reflects the data 
presented at Caltech but also differs in 
substantial ways. Experimentalists are now 
busy creating more focused testbeds that 
work out some of the details of the process 
such as stopping rules, market feedback, and 
considerations of bidding flexibility. The 
new testbeds will challenge the proposed 
Editor's Message 
VVelcon1e to the second issue of the 
HutnanDiniensions Quarterly! This issue intro-
duces a regular feature called Data and 
Information Availability. !Ls purpose is to 
highlight recently produced data resources 
and publications about human interactions in 
the environment. Your recommendations and 
bidding mechanism and search for potential 
problems-ranging from possible theoretical 
inconsistencies to simple electronic "bugs" -
before it is finally implemented. The labora-
tory experiments are likely to be followed by 
small scale field experiments. The technol-
ogy must ~vork and the economics rnust 
work, for the stakes are in the billions of 
dollars and no one \Van ts to garnble on an 
untested mechanism. 
The design and testing of processes aimed at. 
solving complicated, socioeconomic prob-
lems involve exactly the types of problems in 
which laboratory testbed researchers deal. 
The FCC is not an isolated example. Labora-
tory experimental methods have been 
important in the development of mecha-
nisms for the allocation of airport landing 
slots, the sources of electricity generation, air 
pollution rights and permits, access to 
natural gas pipeline networks, space station 
resources, procurement, antitrust issues, 
consumer economics (warranties and 
labels), and contingent valuation and 
environmental damage measurement, to 
mention but a few. The notion that labora-
tory experimental methods have a use in the 
economic policy process is now beginning to 
be accepted. The design of markets and 
process, beginning with first principles and 
followed by laboratory testing is actually 
happening. Through these methods, policy 
debates are guided by evidence and evidence 
backed by theory, and do not reflect simple 
opinion and rhetoric. Facts get involved, 
which to some observers of policy making, is 
a refreshing event. 11 
The author can be contacted by e-mail as 
cplot@hss.caltech.edu or by phone at 
(818) 39f>-4209. 
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